Abstract. This work is about distributed protocols for oblivious transfer, proposed by Naor and Pinkas, and recently generalized by Blundo et. al. In this settings a Sender has n secrets and a Receiver is interested in one of them. The Sender distributes the information about the secrets to m servers, and a Receiver must contact a threshold of the servers in order to compute the secret. These distributed oblivious transfer protocols provide information theoretic security. We present impossibility result and lower bound for existence of one-round threshold distributed oblivious transfer protocols, generalizing the results of Blundo et. al. A threshold based construction implementing 1-out-of-n distributed oblivious transfer achieving the proved lower bound for existence is proposed. A condition for existence of general access structure distributed oblivious transfer scheme is proven. We also present a general access structure protocol implementing 1-out-of-n distributed oblivious transfer.
Introduction
Oblivious Transfer (OT ) refers to several types of two-party protocols where at the beginning of the protocol one party, the Sender, has an input, and at the end of the protocol the other party, the Receiver (sometimes called the chooser), learns some information about this input in a way that does not allow the Sender to figure out what the Receiver has learned. Introduced by M. Rabin in [22] , and subsequently defined in different forms in [15, 5] , the oblivious transfer has found many applications in cryptographic studies and protocol design. A variety of slightly different definitions and implementations can be found in the literature as well as papers addressing issues such as the relation of OT with other cryptographic primitives (e.g. see [1, 3, 6, 12, 13, 19] ). n 1 is presented in Section 4. In sections 5, 6 and 7 a General Access Structure model for DOT − n 1 is analyzed and the corresponding protocol is constructed.
The Distributed Model

Definitions
A distributed r-out-of-m OT − n 1 protocol involves three types of parties: -A Sender S which has n inputs (secrets) s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 . It is convenient to assume that these inputs are elements in a finite field F. -A Receiver R that has an input σ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. -Additional m servers, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m .
We assume that the Sender holds n secrets and the Receiver is interested in one of them. In the distributed setting the Sender S does not directly interact with the Receiver R, in order to carry out the oblivious transfer. Rather, he delegates m servers to accomplish this task for him.
The protocol is composed of the following functional steps:
-Initialization Phase. Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m be m servers. The Sender S generates m programs P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m and, for i = 1, . . . , m sends in a secure way, program P i to the server S i . Each program P i depends on the secrets s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 and on some random data. -Oblivious Transfer Phase. The Receiver R holds a program R which enables her to interact with a subset {S i1 , . . . , S ir } of r servers at her choice. She sends to the server S i a query q i which is a function of σ and i, and of some random data. The server answers the query with a i . Using the answers the Receiver R is collected, she is able to recover the secret in which is interested, receiving no information about the other secrets. At the same time, any subset of t − 1 servers, say {S i1 , . . . , S it−1 } ⊆ {S i1 , . . . , S ir }, does not gain any information about the secret she has recovered.
More precisely, a distributed (r, m)−DOT − n 1 must guarantee the following properties:
-Reconstruction. If the Receiver gets information from r out of the m servers, she can compute the secret s σ . -Sender's Privacy. Given any r values, the Receiver must gain information about a single secret, and no information about the others. -Receiver's Privacy. No coalition of less than t servers gains information about which secret the Receiver has recovered. -Receiver-servers collusion. A coalition of the Receiver with l corrupt servers cannot learn about the n secrets more than can be learned by the Receiver herself.
A Formal Model
In this section we will follow the notations and the formal model given by Blundo et. al. in [4] . Assume that S holds a program S to generate m programs P 1 , . . . , P m enabling S 1 , . . . , S m and R to perform (r, m) − DOT − An execution of the protocol can be described by using the following additional random variables: for j = 1, . . . , m let C j be the transcript of the communication between R and S j . Moreover, let W be the set of all length n sequences of secrets, and, for any w ∈ W , let w i be the i-th secret of the sequence. Denoting by W the random variable that represents the choice of an element in W and by T the random variable representing the choice of an index i in T = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, one can define (as in [4] ) the conditions that (r, m) − DOT − n 1 oblivious transfer protocol must satisfy as follows:
and, for any w ∈ W and for any {i 1 , . . . , i r } ⊆ {1, . . . , m}
The definition means that the transcript of the communication is completely determined by the program of the server S j and the program of the Receiver and her choices. Moreover, after interacting with r servers, an honest Receiver always recovers the secret in which is interested. Assuming that both S and R are aware of the joint probability distribution P W,T on W and T , the probability with which S chooses the secrets in W and R chooses an index i ∈ T , the privacy property of (r, m) − DOT − 
-for any program R, for any i ∈ T and for any set of indices {i 1 , . . . , i r } ⊆ {1, . . . , m},
-for any set of indices {i 1 , . . . , i l } ⊆ {1, . . . , m} for any i ∈ T and for any R,
-for any pair of sets of indices {i 1 , . . . , i l } ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and {j 1 , . . . , j r } ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, for any i ∈ T and for any R,
These first two conditions ensure that a dishonest coalition of t − 1 servers does not gain information about R's index: a dishonest R infers at most one secret among the ones held by S 1 , . . . , S m . Condition (5) takes into account the possibility of an attack against S performed either by at most l servers alone or with the cooperation of R. The condition states that such kind of coalitions do not gain any information about the secrets held by S. Finally, conditions (6) states that a coalition of l servers and the Receiver cannot compute any information about the others, once the Receiver has obtained a secret.
Impossibility Result and Lower Bound for Existence
Using some Information Theory tools and the ideas in [4] we can show that with one round DOT protocol an impossibility result holds for the parameters r, t, and l. And consequently a lower bound for the existence of DOT with parameters r, t, and l will be proved.
First of all, notice that if the protocol is one round, then C j = (Q j , A j ), the query of the Receiver and the answer of the server. Therefore, condition (1) can be re-phrased saying that for j = 1, . . . , m
With this notation, we can prove the following impossibility result:
In any (r, m) − DOT − n 1 scheme with parameters t, and l such that r < t + l, once the Receiver has legally recovered a secret, a coalition of l corrupt servers and the Receiver can recover all the others.
Proof. Let r = l + t − 1 i.e. l = r − t + 1. Let q 1 , . . . , q r be the queries sent by the Receiver when T = i, and let a 1 , . . . , a r be the answers that S 1 , . . . , S r send back to R. The Receiver's security property (3) with respect to t − 1 servers, say S l+1 , . . . , S r , implies that there exist queries q 
Since the answers given by S 1 , . . . , S l depend only on their own programs P 1 , . . . , P l and on the received queries (i.e. H(A j |Q j P j ) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , l) it holds that
Therefore the Receiver and a coalition of l servers can recover all the secrets and the result holds.
The last theorem is a natural extension of Theorem 3.5 in [4] , where the case r = k, t = k, l = 1 is considered.
A consequence of this impossibility result for one-round protocols is the lower bound for existence of DOT with parameters r, t, and l. Corollary 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for existence of (r, m) − DOT − n 1 scheme with parameters t and l is r ≥ t + l.
Proof. The necessity follows directly from Theorem 1. In the next section the protocol implementing (r, m) − DOT − n 1 scheme with parameters t, l and satisfying r = t + l will be presented, which prove the sufficient condition.
Note that two-round protocols, as for example the one proposed in [4] , satisfy the same bound, because two times contacting k servers can be viewed as once contacting 2k servers. Hence r = 2k, t = l = k are suitable parameters for existence of DOT .
Protocol Implementing
Two protocols for (r, m) − DOT − 2 1 have been proposed by Naor and Pinkas in [20] . Recently Blundo et. al. in [4] generalized the idea of Naor and Pinkas and proposed several protocols for (r, m) − DOT − n 1 . The protocols proposed by Naor and Pinkas and two of the protocols in [4] are based on polynomial interpolation. Combinatorial constructions are presented in [4] as well.
In this section we propose a protocol, based on polynomial interpolation. It is a generalization of the protocols of Naor and Pinkas and Blundo et. al. The protocol is described as follows:
Initialization Phase. Let s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ∈ F (F -finite field) be the Sender's S secrets.
1. S generates n − 1 random polynomials B 1 (x), . . . , B n−1 (x) of degree l and one random polynomial B 0 (x) of degree r − 1 ≥ l + t − 1 with values in F such that B 0 (0) = s 0 and, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1,
Finally, for i = 1, . . . , m, he sends the n − 1 variate polynomial Q(i, y 1 , . . . , y n−1 ) to the server S i .
Oblivious Transfer Phase. Let σ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} be the Receiver's R index.
) is an (n − 1)-tuple of zeroes with at most a 1 in position σ, the position corresponding to the secret in which she is interested. Define a univariate polynomial V to be V (x) = Q(x, D 1 (x), . . . , D n−1 (x)). 2. Then, she asks r servers S ij for j = 1, . . . , r, sending a query of the form (D 1 (i j ), . . . , D n−1 (i j )). 3. The server S ij calculates the value
and sends it back to R. 4. After receiving r values of V , say V (i 1 ), . . . , V (i r ), R interpolates V (x) and computes V (0).
Correctness and Security
The correctness of the proposed protocol: The degree of the polynomial V (x) is r−1, hence receiving r values in step 3. the Receiver is able to recover correctly V (x) and calculate V (0). On the other hand assuming that (D 1 (0) , . . . , D n−1 (0)) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (i.e. at most a 1 in position σ), then
Now we will see that the proposed protocol for (r, m) − DOT − n 1 satisfy the four properties described in the definition.
About the Reconstruction as we have already checked our protocol is correct. The Receiver's Privacy is guaranteed against coalitions of at most t − 1 servers, because R herself chooses polynomials D 1 (x), . . . , D n−1 (x) to have degree t−1. Again using the proof for correctness of the proposed protocol it follows that Sender's Privacy is guaranteed. And finally the Receiver-servers collusion, assuming that the Receiver has already calculated one secret and that a coalition of at most l corrupt servers helps her to discover others. Because the Sender S chooses the polynomials B 1 (x), . . . , B n−1 (x) of degree l and a polynomial B 0 (x) of degree r − 1 ≥ l + t − 1, the information these l corrupt servers possess (i.e. B 0 (i j ), B 1 (i j ), . . . , B n−1 (i j ) for j = 1, . . . , l) is insufficient to recover any of the polynomials B 0 (x), B 1 (x), . . . , B n−1 (x), hence it is insufficient to find any of the values B 0 (0), B 1 (0), . . . , B n−1 (0).
Remark: The proposed protocol satisfy r = l + t, which prove the "sufficient" part in the proof of the Corollary 1.
Efficiency
Comparing our scheme with the polynomial scheme of Blundo et. al. they are equal in respect of the following parameters: the memory storage of servers, the complexity of each interaction, the randomness to set up the scheme and the randomness of the whole communication. The proposed here scheme achieves the bounds of Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 in [4] . But the memory storage for the Sender and the Receiver is higher in our scheme, because it provides better security.
One of the questions that Naor and Pinkas arose is how the scheme will ensure that a Receiver does not obtain more than r shares. It is clear that in our scheme the Sender can choose m = r, and solve this problem providing the desired security. Threshold-based schemes make sense only in environment where one assumes that any player subset of a certain cardinality is equally likely (or unlikely) to cheat (or to be corrupted). In many natural scenarios this assumption does not model the reality well, thus we need to protect against general adversary structures. The well known drawback of using general access structure approach than the threshold one is that the memory storage and the complexity of each interaction will be not optimal. In this section we will apply a general access structure method for building a DOT − n 1 .
Definitions
A Distributed General Access Structure OT − n 1 protocol involves the same three types of parties as in the threshold case: Sender, Receiver and servers.
The protocol now is composed in nearly the same way with a few changes in the Oblivious Transfer Phase: The Receiver R holds a program R which enables her to interact with a subset of qualified servers {S i1 , . . . , S ir } ∈ Γ at her choice. At the same time, any subset {S i1 , . . . , S it−1 } ∈ ∆ 1 of forbidden servers, does not gain any information about the secret she has recovered.
More precisely, a Distributed General Access Structure DOT − n 1 must guarantee the following properties: -Reconstruction. If the Receiver gets information from a set of qualified servers G ∈ Γ , she can compute the secret s σ . -Sender's Privacy. Given any set of qualified servers G ∈ Γ values, the Receiver must gain information about a single secret, and no information about the others. -Receiver's Privacy. No coalition of set of forbidden servers G 1 ∈ ∆ 1 gains information about which secret the Receiver has recovered. -Receiver-servers collusion. A coalition of the Receiver with a set of corrupt servers G 2 ∈ ∆ 2 cannot learn about the n secrets more than can be learned by the Receiver herself.
The set of m servers is divided in three sets of subsets Γ, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 of qualified, forbidden and corrupt servers, resp. The set Γ is monotone increasing and the sets ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 are monotone decreasing.
Condition for Existence
First we will give the following definition:
We define the operation * for any monotone decreasing sets ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 as follows:
It is easy to check that ∆ 1 * ∆ 2 is also monotone decreasing.
The same operation for monotone structures is defined by Fehr and Maurer in [14] , which they call element-wise union, in order to give necessary and sufficient conditions for robust VSS and Distributed Commitments.
Using some Information Theory tools we can show, in the same way as in the threshold case (see Theorem 1) , that there is a condition for existence of one-round General Access Structure DOT protocol. Theorem 2. In any General Access Structure DOT − n 1 scheme with set of qualified, forbidden and corrupt servers Γ, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , and such that Γ ∩ (∆ 1 * ∆ 2 ) = ∅, once the Receiver has legally recovered a secret, a coalition of corrupt servers from ∆ 2 and the Receiver can recover all the others.
A consequence of this existence condition for one-round protocols is the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. A necessary condition for existence of General Access Structure DOT − n 1 scheme with set of qualified, forbidden and corrupt servers Γ, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , is the tuple (Γ, ∆ 1 * ∆ 2 ) to be access structure.
Denote by U = {S 1 , . . . , S m } the set of servers and by 2 U the set of all subsets of U. Denote Γ 1 = ∆ c 1 to be the complement of ∆ 1 to the 2 U and Γ 2 = ∆ c 2 to be the complement of ∆ 2 to the 2 U . Correspondingly we have ∆ 1 = Γ c 1 and
We define the operation * for any monotone increasing sets Γ 1 , Γ 2 as follows:
7 General Access Structure protocol for DOT − n 1
In this section we propose a protocol for General Access Structure DOT − n 1 . Most proposed SSS are linear, but the concept of an LSSS was first considered in its full generality by Karchmer and Wigderson in [18] , who introduced the equivalent notion of Monotone Span Program (MSP), which we describe later. Each linear SSS can be viewed as derived from a monotone span program M computing its access structure. On the other hand, each monotone span program gives rise to an LSSS. Hence, one can identify an LSSS with its underlying monotone span program. Such an MSP always exists because MSP's can compute any monotone function. Note that the size of M is also the size of the corresponding LSSS. Now we will consider any access structure, as long as it admits a linear secret sharing scheme.
We will use the definitions and results by Cramer et. al. in [9] about General Secure Multi-Party Computation.
where F is a finite field, M is a matrix (with e rows and d ≤ e columns) over F, ψ : {1, . . . , e} → {1, . . . , m} is a surjective function and ε is a fixed vector, called target vector, e.g. column vector (1, 0, ..., 0) ∈ F d . The size of M is the number of rows (e).
Thus, ψ labels each row with a number from [1, . . . , e] corresponding to a fixed player, hence we can think of each player as being the "owner" of one or more rows. For every player we consider a function ϕ which gives the set of rows owned by the player, i.e. ϕ is (in some sense) inverse of ψ.
It is known (e.g. see [10, Remark 2] ) that the number of columns d can be increased, without changing the access structure that is computed by a MSP. The space generated by the 2nd up to the d-th column of M does not contain even a non-zero multiple of the first column. Without changing the access structure that is computed, we can always replace the 2nd up to the d-th column of M by any set of vectors that generates the same space.
MSP is said to compute an access structure Γ when ε ∈ Im(M T G ) if and only if G is a member of Γ . So, the players can reconstruct the secret precisely if the rows they own contain in their linear span the target vector of M, and otherwise they get no information about the secret, i.e. there exists a so called recombination vector r such that r, M G (s, ρ) = s and M T G r = ε for any secret s and any ρ.
Let f 1 and f 2 be monotone boolean functions, computed by MSP's M 1 = (F, M 1 , ε, ψ) and M 2 = (F, M 2 , ε, ψ). Given two d-vectors x and y, Cramer et. al. in [9, 8] denote x y to be the vector containing all entries of form x i y j , where ψ(i) = ψ(j). Thus, if d i = |ϕ(i)| is the number of rows owned by a player i, then x y has d = i d two secrets using M 1 and M 2 , then the vector x y can be computed using only local computation by the players, i.e. each component of the vector can be computed by one player.
Definition 6. [9, 8] A multiplicative MSPs are the MSPs M 1 and M 2 for which there exists an d-vector r called a recombination vector, such that for any two secrets s and s and any ρ and ρ , it holds that
It means that one can construct a multiplicative MSP computing f 1 ∨ f 2 . We will call it multiplicative result MSP. It means that one can construct a strongly multiplicative MSP computing f 1 ∨ f 2 , this MSP we will call strongly multiplicative result MSP.
We are now ready to describe the protocol for General Access Structure DOT − n 1 scheme with set of qualified, forbidden and corrupt servers Γ, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , resp., and the corresponding three access structures Γ, Γ 1 , Γ 2 .
Let Γ 1 , Γ 2 be the access structures with the MSPs M 1 and M 2 , which possess strongly multiplicative property. Denote by Γ the access structure corresponding to the strongly multiplicative result MSP M (see Definition 7). Thus, a necessary condition for existence of General Access Structure DOT − n 1 scheme, which turns out to be also a sufficient condition, is the following. Theorem 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for existence of General Access Structure DOT − n 1 scheme with set of qualified, forbidden and corrupt servers Γ, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , and the corresponding to them three access structures Γ, Γ 1 , Γ 2 is that their MSPs M, M 1 and M 2 are DOT MSPs. Now we are ready to present the following protocol for General Access Structure DOT − n Initialization Phase. Let s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ∈ F be the Sender's S secrets. There are three access structures Γ, Γ 1 , Γ 2 and corresponding to them three MSPs M 1 = (F, M 1 , ε, ψ), M 2 = (F, M 2 , ε, ψ) and M = (F, M, ε, ψ) as well as the "reverse" functions ϕ and ϕ. In our construction we require Γ = Γ , i.e. ϕ = ϕ and ψ = ψ. As we noted before the number of columns in the MSP can be increased without changing the access structure that is computed by a MSP. Therefore we can assume that the number of columns in the MSPs M, M 1 and M 2 is equal to d. Oblivious Transfer Phase. Let σ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} be the Receiver's R index.
1. R generates n − 1 random vectors D 1 , . . . , D n−1 ∈ F d such that ( D 1 , ε , . . . , D n−1 , ε ) is an (n − 1)-tuple of zeroes with at most a 1 in position σ, the position corresponding to the secret in which she is interested. 2. Then she asks a set of qualified servers S i , sending a query of n−1 packets of temporary shares (v and sends it back to R. 4. After receiving values (v S ) ϕ(i) for a set of qualified servers (i.e. i ∈ G and G ∈ Γ ) the Receiver is able to recover the secret s σ . First she computes r, such that M T ϕ(G) r = ε and then she computes s σ = (v S ) ϕ(G) , r .
Correctness and Security
The correctness of the proposed protocol: We have B 0 , ε = s 0 and, s j − s 0 = B j , ε for j = 1, . . . , n − 
